




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Moscow Intervenes in a Policy Debate: The Case of Opposition to US Missiles in West Germany

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An Intelligence Assessment

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GI 84-10076
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An Intelligence Assessment

This paper was prepared by [redacted] Office
of Global Issues. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Communist Activities Branch, International
Security Issues Division, [redacted]

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Key Judgments

Information available
as of 12 April 1984
was used in this report.

Moscow demonstrated its ability to influence political debate in other countries last year during the campaign against the deployment of US missiles in West Germany. Although unsuccessful in blocking deployment, Moscow was able to keep the prime focus of the debate on the new US missiles and away from the fact that the deployments were a response to Soviet emplacement of hundreds of Soviet SS-20s. []

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[] the Soviets believe the publicity given the peace movement strengthened their hand in the negotiations in Geneva on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). []

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Moscow is calling for continued resistance to the US missiles and will use the methods employed last autumn to focus attention on additional deployments:

- Soviet radiobroadcasts in German are warning that the deployments have their price: no nuclear arms control negotiations unless the US missile shipments are reversed. Media articles may become more intimidating, as they did last autumn warning that West Germany, "a small, densely populated country" was in "mortal danger" if it allowed itself to be used as a "launching pad" for US missiles.
- Central Committee propagandists have directed West German Communist parties and fronts to protest each Pershing II increment as it arrives and to assure West German audiences that Soviet military countermeasures will cease once the US missiles are removed.
- The Soviet-dominated World Peace Council met in West Berlin in January and vowed [] to renew its campaign against the US missiles. The council president asserted earlier, [] that the council would join other groups to blockade the installation sites. []
[]
- We expect the Soviet-German Friendship Society—also active in presenting the Soviet views last fall—to continue to be active in the next phase, since Leonid Zamyatin, chief of the Central Committee International Information Department, is the chairman.

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• [redacted] [redacted]
Last autumn, the West German Communist parties
materially supported the movement with workers, money, experienced
organizers for mass demonstrations, and printing presses. [redacted]

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Moscow Intervenes in a Policy Debate: The Case of Opposition to US Missiles in West Germany

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Moscow can generate political pressure against a foreign government whose policies it opposes in many ways, often encompassing propaganda agencies, front organizations, and local Communist parties. These resources were used most recently in the attempt to influence the West German Bundestag's vote last autumn on deploying US Pershing II and cruise missiles. The Soviet media, CPSU Central Committee departments, West German affiliates of the World Peace Council, the Soviet Embassy and consulates, and the Soviet-German Friendship Society, as well as the Communist Parties of West Berlin and West Germany were all used by Moscow in an attempt to influence the public debate on deployment. Although Moscow was unable to stop the deployments, these organizations were successful in penetrating the peace movement and in helping to focus protests on the US missiles and away from the fact that the deployments were a response to Soviet emplacement of hundreds of Soviet SS-20s. The Soviets have instructed these organizations to continue the resistance this year and evidently plan to support more demonstrations, the peace movement's proposed national referendum on the missiles, and other protest actions against scheduled missile arrivals.

Soviet Media Coverage

The Soviet media tried to influence a broad cross section of the West German public both by intimidation and by friendly persuasion. Moscow Radio's German-language broadcasts carrying TASS and *Pravda* stories warned West German audiences in October and November that the Federal Republic would be targeted by Soviet nuclear forces if US missiles were deployed. TASS on 17 November graphically described West Germany as "a small, densely populated country" which would be in "mortal danger" if it allowed itself to be used as a "launching pad" for US "first-strike" weapons. *Pravda* chief editor Afanasyev asserted that Moscow would feel compelled to deploy military countermeasures that would improve neither country's security and would increase the danger of war. He implied that the Soviets would have to respond militarily

because Pershing IIs have an alleged capability to reach their targets in the USSR three to eight minutes after launch and to penetrate ground-sheltered Soviet nuclear forces and military command centers to a depth of 30 meters. Under those circumstances, TASS warned in advance, nuclear arms control negotiations would be impossible.

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Soviet media publicized the peace movement in an attempt, we believe, to attract additional proponents by exaggerating the movement's political strength. "Most of the FRG population, trade unions, entire parties, and numerous organizations, associations, and federations oppose" US intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), *Pravda* asserted on 18 November. The government in Bonn would be ignoring its own public opinion, *Pravda* argued, if it proceeded with deployment. TASS attributed the "noticeable turn" of the Social Democratic Party—from an original proponent of new US missiles in Europe under NATO's dual-track decision to an opponent of deployment—to the influence of the "mighty" peace movement.

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Central Committee Work

Soviet propagandists in the International and International Information Departments of the Central Committee actively inserted themselves into the West German debate. Bundestag delegations of Social Democrat and Green deputies as well as Young Socialists and German Communists were invited to Moscow, allowing the Soviets to press their case directly. Soviet propagandists—expert at packaging an attractive approach to the issues without departing in any substantive way from Soviet political or military requirements—tailored their approach to fit the target group:

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- To the *Social Democrats*, the Soviets conveyed the seriousness with which Moscow views INF deployment, reinforcing their diplomatic case with intimidation.

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TASS ©

Figure 1. Vadim Zagladin, first deputy chief, International Department, Soviet Central Committee [redacted]



TASS ©

Figure 2. Boris Ponomarev, chief, International Department, Soviet Central Committee [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted] the USSR would have no choice but to prepare military countermeasures against the Pershing II launchsites in West Germany because, [redacted] the Pershings had only a four-minute flight time before striking the Soviet Union.

Ominous hints were also made by Vitaly Shaposhnikov, [redacted]

[redacted] he was concerned about a real danger of war and that the outlook was gloomy. The Soviets made frequent and varied attempts to cultivate Social Democratic opposition to deployment.

- For the **Greens**, Zagladin, his superior Boris Ponomarev, Shaposhnikov, and other government and military officials rolled out the red carpet in November. They received Petra Kelly and Gert Bastian, two leading figures of the party, and five other Greens at the Kremlin. The Greens urged the Soviets to take unilateral steps toward disarmament. Ponomarev explained that the USSR already had unilaterally offered to reduce the number of SS-20s targeting Western Europe, renounced first-use of nuclear weapons, and introduced a moratorium on SS-20 deployments, according to *Sovetskaya Rossiya*. He argued that Washington had ignored these initiatives and said "any good will has its limits." According to *Pravda*, the Soviets urged the Greens to do everything in their power to prevent deployment.

- Toward the **German Communists**, particularly Herbert Mies, West German party chairman, and Horst Schmitt, chairman of the West Berlin party, the Central Committee propagandists took a more

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Sovfoto ©

Figure 3. Herbert Mies, chairman, West German Communist Party




Neues Deutschland ©

Figure 4. Horst Schmitt, chairman, West Berlin Communist Party

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pointed approach. The propagandists, including Valentin Falin, former first deputy chief of the International Information Department, had been advising them for at least two years that Moscow gave top priority to the two parties' work with the peace movement,



against the missiles.¹ The Prague World Peace Assembly in June was the centerpiece of the council's efforts last year. The council's West German affiliates, many of which attended the Prague Assembly, complied with its priorities. The Committee for Peace, Disarmament, and Cooperation (KFAZ), with 10 members of its bureau also council members, termed the "fight against NATO counterarming the crucial question of 1983,"

The German Peace Union (DFU), a council affiliate, promoted the Krefeld Appeal, a drive to collect signatures on a petition asking Bonn to refuse US missile deployments. Scientists for Peace and Disarmament, which includes Hans Krymanski, a West German Communist who serves on the council's Presidential Committee, supported the October week of demonstrations.

World Peace Council affiliates, together with related fronts of the West German and West Berlin Communist Parties, have attempted to extend their influence

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The Role of World Peace Council Affiliates
The Soviet-sponsored World Peace Council assigned first priority in 1983 to the propaganda campaign

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Figure 5. Valentin Falin, *Izvestiya* foreign affairs commentator; former first deputy chief, International Information Department, Soviet Central Committee, and former Soviet Ambassador to Bonn

in the non-Communist left and in the Social Democratic and Green Parties as well as in the peace movement. The West German Communist Party has about 50 front organizations. Among these, the Socialist German Workers Youth (SDAJ) and Spartakus Marxist Student Federation (MSB) have been particularly active in working with Social Democratic youth and the peace movement. The West Berlin Communist Party has founded or cofounded front groups as peace initiatives, including the citywide Youth Initiative Against Rearmament and Artists Initiative for Peace. It has heavy representation in the 10 district peace initiatives and has supported peace concerts, film showings, lectures, and seminars with anti-INF themes. Most of the fronts of these two parties have East German counterparts and, frequently, East German connections.

The Work of the Soviet Embassy, Consulates, and Friendship Societies

The Soviet Embassy in Bonn mounted an intensive effort in the corridors of the Bundestag before last autumn's vote. Soviet Embassy officials met or entertained deputies willing to listen to the Soviet case. Although we have no firm information on the extent of this activity, US Embassy personnel in Bonn

believe it was substantial.

The Embassy also facilitated Egon Bahr's visit with Soviet Ambassador Kvitsinsky in Geneva. The West German Government officially protested these intrusions into the Bundestag debate.

Soviet Consulates in West Germany actively supported the peace work of the West German Communist Party at the grassroots level.

Consular officers in Hamburg frequently spoke at city and county chapter meetings of the party in Bremen, Bremerhaven, Hamburg, Kiel, Luneberg, and Wedel. In Hamburg they also spoke at schools and civic organizations. Foreign diplomats are prohibited by West German law from speaking at political rallies.

At the larger rallies Soviet diplomats even took the precaution of holding discussions in tents to avoid being accused by West German authorities of addressing a public rally. The Soviet Consulate in West Berlin has been circumspect in its contacts with the Communist Party there in deference to the Allied authorities.

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Table 1
World Peace Council Affiliates and Related
Front Organizations in West Germany and West Berlin

Organization	Estimated Membership	CPSU/WPC/GDR ^a and Other Soviet Front Linkages
Socialist German Workers Youth (SDAJ)	15,000 (with 100 factory groups)	Soviet Komsomol; World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY); GDR Free German Youth (FDJ)
Young Pioneers (JP)	3,500	International Committee of Children's and Adolescents' Movement (CIMEA); GDR children's movements
Spartakus Marxist Student Federation (MSB)	6,000	Soviet Komsomol; WFDY; GDR FDJ
Association of Persecutees of the Nazi Regime/ League of Antifascists (VVN-VdA)		World Peace Council; GDR Committee of Antifascist Resistance Fighters (IFR)
German Peace Union (DFU)		Soviet Committee for Defense of Peace; World Peace Council; GDR Peace Council
Committee for Peace, Disarmament and Cooperation (KFAZ)		Soviet Committee for Defense of Peace; World Peace Council; GDR Peace Council
German Peace Society/Associated Objectors to Military Service (DFG-VK)	21,500	World Peace Council; GDR Peace Council
Democratic Women's Initiative (DFI)		Committee of Soviet Women; GDR Democratic Women's League (DFD)
Union of Democratic Jurists in the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin (VDJ)		International Union of Democratic Jurists (IUDJ); GDR Union of Democratic Jurists
In West Berlin		
Party college groups	400	
Action Associations of Democrats and Socialists (ADS)	500	
Karl Liebknecht Socialist Youth Association (SJV)	700	Soviet Komsomol; GDR FDJ
Democratic Women's League of Germany (DFB)	600	GDR Democratic Women's League
West Berlin Association of Persecutees of the Nazi Regime/Association of Antifascists (VVN-VdA)	300	GDR IFR

^a CPSU—Communist Party of the Soviet Union; WPC—World Peace Council; GDR—East German.

Source: West German Interior Ministry.



Communist Party Activities

In response to Soviet and East German requirements to give priority to working within the peace movement, the Communist Parties of West Berlin and West Germany committed cadres of party workers, money, experience at handling mass demonstrations, printing presses, and organizing skills to the movement. Communist Party personnel took key positions

in the coordinating committees of the peace movement. The parties, their fronts, and affiliated organizations saturated the planning conferences for the October "action week." They contributed substantially to the logistics of the nonviolent demonstrations—providing speakers, hospitality tents, crowd monitors and ushers, loudspeaker vans, newspaper advertising,

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Figure 6
Soviet Consulates and Chapters of the Soviet-German Friendship Society in West Germany



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Figure 7. Water cannon dispersing a demonstration in Hamburg during "October Week" 1983 [redacted]



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Figure 8. Human blockade in Hamburg, October 1983 [redacted]



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posters, and leaflets. They invariably favored large, peaceful demonstrations for media impact and opposed the plans of the autonomous groups in the peace movement for violent demonstrations such as the one at Bremerhaven, [redacted]

Pershing II sites. *Unsere Zeit*, the party newspaper, subsequently published a map giving the locations and descriptions of the installations and missile sites. [redacted] this map, republished in the West German media, facilitated plans for blockades at the sites by the peace movement.

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In associated activities:

- The West German Communist Party, as part of an effort dubbed "Operation Powderkeg," collected data on US military installations and suspected

Figure 9. Anti-INF demonstration in Bonn, 22 October 1983



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- The West Berlin Communist Party attempted to recruit US military personnel stationed in West Berlin to participate in the 1983 demonstrations, arguing that the German people did not dislike Americans, only the administration in Washington, [redacted] This was done covertly through neighborhood peace committees and through fronts such as the Artists Initiative for Peace, controlled by the party.

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- Both parties collected signatures for anti-INF petitions, transported people from all regions of West Germany to participate in mass demonstrations, dominated the Easter peace marches, [redacted]

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Moscow is the prime adviser to the West German and West Berlin Communist Parties, but we believe the East Germans provide most of the close, detailed guidance in line with Soviet policy.

An Assessment

Although unable to prevent a Bundestag vote favoring deployment, the Soviets contributed importantly to intensifying the West German debate, making it more anti-United States. They also helped to shape the debate so that it diverted attention from the SS-20 deployment that prompted the NATO response and US deployments. To achieve these ends, the Soviets brought the full weight of their political infrastructure—media, fronts, and parties—to bear on the policy debate. Moscow's gains last autumn include:

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- The inroads made by Communist Parties and front organizations into the peace movement, a loose coalition of Green Party supporters, church groups, Young Socialists, violence-prone autonomous

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groups, and prominent personalities. The Communists succeeded in large part because they were virtually unopposed by any equally skilled political organization. The Social Democratic Party or the West German Trade Union Federation, either of which could have matched the Communist efforts, remained outside the movement.

- Success by the Communist Parties and fronts in limiting criticism by the peace movement of the Soviet SS-20s and focusing protest actions principally on US Pershing II and cruise missiles. The peace movement operates on the basis of a minimal consensus. With Communist participation, the lowest common denominator tends to be opposition to the US missiles.

- Strengthening the Soviet bargaining position at the Geneva INF negotiations, [redacted]
[redacted] Because of the activities of the peace movement, Moscow apparently did not feel the need to compromise at Geneva. The US delegation to the Geneva talks reported that the Soviets frequently referred to the peace movement and to the public opinion polls on the missile issue published in the international press.

- The vote against deployment in the Social Democratic Party special conference and the Bundestag. This was a positive development from the Soviets' point of view even though they had little to do with it directly.

- Perhaps most important, the practical experience gained with the so-called new politics of protest movements, including the political bent of German youth, ecologists' alliances, and feminists' movements.

[redacted] helps Moscow gauge the political significance of events in which these same personalities become involved. [redacted]

Outlook

We expect Moscow to use the infrastructure now in place to press opposition to the missiles during the two-year deployment of Pershing IIs and perhaps longer for cruise missile deployments. *Soviet media* already are urging resistance to missile arrivals. The media are taking pains to point out alleged US bad faith and the history of unrewarded Soviet concessions in the Geneva INF talks as the Soviet rationale for staying away from any further INF negotiations unless the deployments are reversed. Moscow may be looking for impatience among the West German population to prompt demands for a pause in missile arrivals and installation so that negotiations can resume. The Soviet media also are courting Social Democrats, Greens, and the peace movement with proposals for a nuclear freeze between the superpowers, no first use of nuclear weapons by either superpower, a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe embracing both Germanys, and nonaggression pacts between the two blocs in Europe. [redacted]

Ponomarev, chief of the *Central Committee* International Department, [redacted]

[redacted] Judging from Ponomarev's article in the December *Kommunist*, the new guidelines for work with the peace movement are as follows:

- Explain persistently and graphically that the United States was to blame for failure of the Geneva INF negotiations.
- Create new slogans for curtailing deployment and for removing the missiles already in place.
- Protest the appearance of each new missile.
- Assure audiences that Soviet countermeasures will cease and nuclear arms control negotiations will resume if the missiles are not deployed.

Chernenko and Ponomarev told West Berlin Communist officials in early February that the deployments are not irreversible, according to TASS. [redacted]

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Communist front organizations have already begun their efforts. The World Peace Council met in West Berlin in January to renew its own propaganda campaign against the US missiles, [redacted] Council President Chandra, [redacted] is on record asserting that the organization would continue its opposition to the missiles, including blockades with other groups at the installation sites. The council hopes to collaborate with independent peace organizations throughout Western Europe. The choice of West Berlin for the January meeting may have been designed to appeal to the West European groups. The meeting was completely subsidized by Aeroflot, East Germany, and other Bloc governments. [redacted]

The council's West German affiliates are planning demonstrations for this year. [redacted] the German Peace Society/United War Service Opponents, for example, has appealed to West German civil servants and police to authorize demonstrations, tolerate civil disobedience by the peace movement, and make streets and facilities available for protest actions. [redacted] a coordinating conference of the peace movement at a February meeting in Cologne with Communist participation discussed plans for a national referendum on the missile issue in June at the time of European parliamentary elections. [redacted]

Similarly, the **German-Soviet Friendship Society** almost certainly will be activated for the next phase. According to *Izvestiya*, the Society reelected Leonid Zamyatin, head of the Central Committee International Information Department, as the society's chairman in December. With Zamyatin as chairman, we can expect the society to continue an aggressive campaign against the missiles. [redacted]

Moscow expects the **Communist Parties** in West Germany and West Berlin to continue actions along the lines of last autumn's campaign although it is aware the peace movement is more divided. The Soviets' pragmatic approach to collaboration with the peace movement will push the parties to cooperate

with a wide spectrum of West German groups that continue to oppose the missiles. The parties received confidential written instructions from the Soviet Central Committee late last autumn to keep the missile issue before the Bundestag and the public after deployment began, [redacted]

[redacted] keeping the West German and West Berlin peace movements alive and functioning is still a major task for the party. [redacted] the West Berlin party supported a mass demonstration last month to focus attention on the alleged danger to West Germany in INF deployments. [redacted]

Although the probability of the peace movement in West Germany matching the public impact it had last year has declined, the Communist parties may play a larger role in a smaller movement. In addition, since public opinion polls in West Germany are still running strongly against US deployments, we believe the peace movement, and the Communists' ability to work with it, will remain a latent problem. [redacted]

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